CALIFORNIA APPELLATE COURT'S RULING ON MANSON'S RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION (1976)


PEOPLE V. MANSON 61 C.A.3d 102; 132 Cal.Rptr. 265
(41) Criminal Law ß 87; Rights of Accused; Aid of Counsel--Self- representation.;Defendant, convicted with others of murder and conspiracy to commit murder arising out of two successive multiple homicides, could not successfully contend on appeal that he was erroneously denied the fundamental right to proceed pro se. At the time counsel was appointed for defendant and his codefendants there was no constitutional right to proceed pro se at trial and a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision invalidating that rule has no retroactive application. Moreover, defendant's contention that he was prejudiced by not being permitted to represent himself was not supported by the record.
RlGHT TO COUNSEL
(41) Only Manson contends on this appeal that he was erroneously denied the fundamental right to proceed pro se. However, all appellants early in the case applied to the trial court to so proceed. The ultimate decision of the lower court was that no appellant was capable of self representation. At the time counsel was appointed for each appellant, there "[was] no constitutional right to proceed pro se at trial." (People v. Sharp (1972) 7 Cal.3d 448, 451 [103 Cal.Rptr. 233, 499 P.2d 489].)
While this appeal was pending, Sharp was invalidated by the United States Supreme Court. (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525].) However, our own Supreme Court has concluded that "the Faretta decision is not to be given retroactive application...." (People v. McDaniel (1976) 16 Cal.3d 156, 163 [127 Cal.Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843].) Consequently, Faretta has no application to this appeal. No other error is attributable to the fact that no appellant was permitted to proceed pro se. Manson's contention that he was prejudiced by not being permitted to represent himself is not supported by the record.